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I suspect that symposia like this one are convened when it seems
that something has gone wrong.' I sense that the community of legal
scholars is afflicted with a vague malaise, sometimes girded about by
a pretentious complacency. 2 Perhaps more important, that community
has been operating for some years outside the main currents of sig-
nificant intellectual activity. I cannot imagine, for example, an in-
tellectual history of contemporary America in which legal thought
would play an important part. There may of course be an erroneous
premise implicit in the view that legal scholarship should be a cen-
tral element of the serious intellectual discourse in this country. After
all, law, like engineering, is an applied rather than pure endeavor,
and no one expects engineers to participate in the intellectual life
of the community.3 Yet, in the past, legal thought has been a com-
ponent of important intellectual movements. Holmes and the Legal
Realists played an important part in the story of American intellec-
tual life in the earlier part of the twentieth century. 4 In contrast, few
of the various strands of contemporary thought are informed by le-
gal scholarship. 5 Even as prominent a contemporary legal scholar as
Alexander Bickel, for example, warrants but two passing mentions
in Peter Steinfels's examination of neoconservatism. 6 The intellectual
marginality of legal scholarship is all the more striking in light of
the immense role that law plays in American society.
7
My topic is that marginality. I contend that legal scholarship lies
at the edges of serious intellectual activity because of the nature of
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
1. Cf. Persons, The Wingspread Papers, 7 REv. AM. HIsT. 447 (1979) (similar observa-
tion about papers from conference on intellectual history).
2. This impression is supported by such evidence as Professor Gilmore's elegant dys-
pepsia. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
3. But see D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979);
T. VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1921).
4. See E. PURCELL, THE Cisis Or DEMOCRATIC THEoRY 74-76, 208 (1973); M. WHITE,
SOCIA THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 59-75 (1949).
5. The exception might be Ronald Dworkin's role in mainline liberal thought. My
comments below, see note 53 infra, suggest that he may be playing that role in his
capacity as a philosopher rather than as a legal scholar.
6. P. STEINFELs, THE NEO-CONSERVATIVES 5, 6 (1979).
7. In the manner of Julia, I refrain from the obligatory citation to de Tocqueville.
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the legal scholar's enterprise. In part the problem derives from the
dilemmas of professional education in an academic setting. Outside
the law school, the main currents of twentieth-century intellectual life,
encompassing Max Weber's work, phenomenology, structuralism, and
much more, have been driven by scholars' efforts to confront and
resolve the question of how an assertedly objective intellectual en-
terprise could be founded on what analysis showed was an unavoid-
ably subjective base.8 For those who teach lawyers, however, the ques-
tion is irrelevant. The conflict between objectivity and subjectivity
is alien to their enterprise because no one believes that advocates are,
or should be, objective. Thus, in their role as teachers of lawyers,
legal scholars are not confronted by the most stimulating problem
of twentieth-century intellectual life, and the pressures of professional
education make it enormously difficult for them to escape from the
constraints of that role.
But more than professionalism or the institutional structure of le-
gal education is involved in the failure of the legal scholar's enter-
prise to confront the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity
that has animated discussions outside the law. Legal scholars' profes-
sional endeavors may make them aware that legal rules have no ob-
jective content. They cannot bring this personal insight into their
scholarly work, however, because their acceptance of fundamental prin-
ciples of liberal political theory requires them to proceed as if legal
rules do have objective content.
In its unadorned Hobbesian version, liberal theory begins with the
premise that each of us desires as much as he or she can obtain.9
We are inclined to grasp everything within reach, without regard to
the desires or interests of others.10 Nevertheless, we recognize that our
desire for more will generally be thwarted in the war of all against
all. Liberal theory proposes that we solve this dilemma by surrender-
ing some of our autonomy to the state in exchange for security in
our possessions. That surrender creates the new danger, however, that
the state will exercise the power that we give it in ways that reduce
both our possessions and our security. The rule of law is our pro-
tection against the state. The state must be constrained by rules that
are independent of the desires of those charged with applying them
in order to protect individual autonomy and prevent the state from
8. See H. HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AD SociEY 15-17 (1958); H. HUGHES, THE OSTRUCrED
PATH 9-15 (1968).
9. See C. MACPHERSON, THE PoLITIcAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962).
10. Some exception may be made for dose relatives.
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becoming another weapon for partisans to use in the general war.
The acquiescence of individuals to the liberal rule of law depends
upon their continued unshakable faith in its objectivity. Thus the
conflict between objectivity and subjectivity cannot readily be con-
fronted within the legal sphere without undermining liberal society
itself.11
The fate of Legal Realism suggests the poignancy of the dilemmas
that legal academics face. Most generally, Realism was a simple and
unproblematic attack on the idea that the body of legal doctrine pro-
vided an objective basis for decisions in specific instances. Some Real-
ists tried to escape this conclusion by emphasizing the law's relation
to social policy, but that route only opened the legal system to even
more basic challenges. First, policies are more obviously controversial
than the apparently purely deductive arguments of case analysis. The
appearance of objectivity could be maintained only by invoking poli-
cies of an extremely general sort.12 Second, neither those policies nor
indeed any others could be brought to bear on a specific problem to
provide a single solution. Policies, like precedents, could always be
used to argue for contradictory results. Neither doctrine nor policy
proved sufficient to satisfy the liberal premise that human behavior
can be governed by rules that have some supra-individual content.
As I will argue, legal scholars have ignored or rejected without seri-
ous analysis the disturbing implications of the Realist challenge to
the objectivity of the rule of law.
I will develop this argument by examining the body of work now
accepted as legal scholarship. I rely in part on a survey of law re-
view articles,13 but my own observations as a member of the aca-
11. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLMcs (1975).
12. The work of Lasswell and McDougal is the most obvious example.
15. The details of the survey will be provided on request. Briefly, I examined the
signed articles published in the two most recently completed volumes of the following
law reviews: Columbia, California, Duke, Michigan, New York University, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Virginia. I chose those law reviews because they are published at relatively
elite schools in the hierarchy of legal education. I excluded the schools at the top of
the hierarchy-Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale-because, in my judgment, there is
a break in the stratification system between the two groups of schools. That judgment
could be confirmed by an examination of the circulation of faculty members, which I
suspect would show that faculty circulate within each stratum and that the most elite
schools accept faculty members from the less elite schools, but faculty from the more
elite schools do not move to the less elite schools.
I excluded student work from the analysis because it is so heavily weighted toward
what I describe as the first form of scholarship that its inclusion would distort any rough
statistical judgments in a highly misleading way. I also note here, but do not analyze,
the phenomenon of privileged access to law reviews. Such privileged access has three
forms. A scholar at a more elite school can almost automatically get an article published
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demic community form a more important basis for the argument.
In this inquiry, I treat myself as an informant.14
Legal scholarship today has three forms, for which I have been un-
able to develop non-invidious labels. The first is traditional legal
advocacy, the second is advocacy augmented with concepts drawn
from nonlegal fields of thought, and the third is the study of law as
a phenomenon. The third form of scholarship is qualitatively differ-
ent from the first two; roughly, the first two are normative enter-
prises, while the third is a positive one. I will argue that the first
two forms seek to establish the proper or best legal rule. In doing so,
they make claims to objectivity that are contradicted by their inher-
ent partisanship. The third form attempts to escape this dilemma. If
it can be done at all, the third form can be done only at the most
elite schools, where professional pressures are weakest. Such schools,
however, maintain their elite position in part by their role in the
professional enterprise. Under those circumstances, it is not surpris-
ing that legal scholars have, except in isolated cases, been unable to
connect their work to the basic themes of contemporary intellectu-
al life.
Most of the articles published as legal scholarship constitute what
I have called traditional legal advocacy. 15 These articles most starkly
reflect the impact of professional demands upon the academy. Prac-
ticing lawyers and others who attempt to affect public policy through
law are busy people. Law reviews give them some convenient research
tools, through articles that present the arguments for one position
or another and explain how the arguments for contrary positions can
be rebutted. The structure of such articles makes it clear that they
contribute little to reducing the marginality of legal scholarship.
The standard traditional advocacy article has two variants: the
case analysis and the policy prescription. The case analysis argues that,
when one looks at the cases, certain conclusions follow. For example,
one recent article deals with the constitutionality of statutes that limit
in a review at a less elite school. Ceremonial addresses in formal lecture series will almost
always be published. These forms of privileged access are infrequently used. Much more
significant is the fact that law reviews will almost always publish the work of scholars
on the faculties at their own schools.
14. I should note that my primary informant, myself, finds himself on the margins
of the legal academic world. The Law School at the University of Wisconsin has at-
tempted to take a path that is quite different from those followed by other schools. In
addition, my personal sense of marginality, though qualified by such things as my
participation in this symposium, is nonetheless real. I observe, however, that with the
exception of Professor Posner, who is obviously a special case, I am the only participant
presenting a major paper who has not taught at Harvard or Yale (or both).
15. In the survey, between 60% and 70% of the articles were of this form.
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the ability of a defendant accused of rape to examine aspects of the
victim's history.16 It discusses the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and concludes that
some of the statutory limitations are unconstitutional. The authors
treat their conclusions as deductions from the Constitution, but the
legacy of Realism makes that impossible for serious readers to accept.
17
Instead, the article must be read, as I suspect it was intended to be
read, as a research aid for lawyers who defend persons accused of
rape, and for the judges before whom those lawyers appear.18
The policy prescription identifies some goal that the author thinks
ought to be pursued. It uses common sense and a rough-and-ready
folk sociology or economics to sketch how to achieve the objective.
Unlike the case analysis, the policy prescription tends to be relatively
open about the act of choice inherent in selecting a goal. Like the
case analysis, however, the policy prescription places the act of choice
in a frame designed to obscure its subjective and essentially arbitrary
character. The choice is made under the guise of identifying a prob-
lem to be solved. "Everyone knows," for example, that corporations'
boards of directors are unresponsive to the interests of some of those
whose lives are affected by their decisions. The solution of that "prob-
lem" can be discovered by applying common sense notions about
representation and responsiveness."' The policy prescription usually
ends with a suggestion about how the policy could be enacted into
law and is therefore the ideal legislative history.
Despite intended appearances to the contrary, both case analysis
and policy prescription rely on choices that are not only subjective
but controversial. The dialogue they promote is often intellectually
16. Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 544 (1980).
17. In this article, I assume that Realism has carried the day to the extent described.
I defend that assumption elsewhere. See Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1981
Wis. L. Rav. 1383.
18. One variation, case analysis carried to its highest level, lies in the transitional
zone between the two forms. Although there are a few examples from other areas, see
e.g., Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HAgv. L. REV. 567 (1978); Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie
After the Death of Diversity? 78 MicH. L. Rav. 311 (1980), the best example is the scholastic
debate among proponents of various types of interest analysis that allegedly elucidate
conflicts of law. An outsider to the discusion finds it bizarre that elaborate competing
structures of analysis have been erected on the basis of policies so general that, one
would have thought, they could not possibly dictate the kinds of results that interest
analysts claim for them. See Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True
Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAuE. L. REv. 577 (1980).
19. See, e.g.. C. STONE, WHm Tm LAw ENs (1975); R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. Sx.xc-
MAN, TAMING THE GIANT CO PORATION (1976).
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sterile, 20 because someone else can simply choose another goal and
use the same type of analysis to come to the opposite conclusion. An
article that goes with the crooks is followed by one that goes with the
prosecutors;21 one that says that corporate responsibility is a problem
is answered by one that says that everything is hunky-dory.
The most intriguing question that remains is why a frame of ob-
jectivity is placed around the discussions that I have described. Legal
Realism produced the insight that case analysis cannot generate ob-
jective answers to legal problems. Bringing concerns about policy to
the fore, which some lawyers saw as the only way to save the system,
has turned out to be equally manipulable. What is puzzling is the insis-
sistence of authors of even the most advocacy-oriented articles that
they do have the objective answers. The objective posture may be
just another technique of advocacy. "I like it" is not a very good
argument, but "the Constitution says so," stated with appropriate
emphasis and in a sincere tone, can be persuasive. I will return to
the possibility that an objective posture is good advocacy because the
norm of objectivity is an essential element of liberal political theory
after discussing the other forms of legal scholarship.
The second form of scholarship, advocacy augmented with concepts
from other fields, is a reaction to the failings of the first form of
scholarship. It accepts the conclusion that solutions to legal problems
cannot be found within the framework of what we traditionally had
thought of as law, defined here to include both legal reasoning and
common sense. Nevertheless, it retains the hope of reaching objec-
tively defensible results by relying on ideas that are drawn from fields
in which scholars' partisanship is not as apparent. Unfortunately, the
hope is bound to be disappointed because problems of objectivity
and subjectivity infect other fields as pervasively as they do law. The
ultimate effect is only to conceal the point at which subjective choice
is inserted into the analysis. Indeed, one measure of the quality of
scholarship of the second form is the cleverness with which that point
is obscured.
20. When those who disagree on proximate goals agree on ultimate ends, the sterility
of their discussions results from the ability of sophisticated analysis to show how ac-
complishing either proximate goal will promote the ultimate end. See note 24 infra.
21. In fact, more articles supporting crooks are written, largely because of the so-
ciology of legal education. With the expansion of clinical programs in law schools, sig-
nificant numbers of people with academic interests were hired to staff those programs.
Whether on tenure tracks or not, the new faculty members were attracted to writing
for law reviews and, because the largest group in their clientele consisted of people
accused of committing crime, they were attracted to the pro-crook position. The pre-
dominance of that approach is enhanced by the general phenomenon that exists in higher
education of younger faculty members writing more than older ones.
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The second form of scholarship has two variants, doctrinal and
policy analysis, which parallel the variants found in the first form.
Doctrinal analysis of the second form, like traditional case analysis,
invokes a very general, allegedly formal, guiding principle and claims
to be able to derive determinate solutions to particular legal problems
by application of that principle. For case analysis, the frame of refer-
ence is the logical and aesthetic requirements of traditional legal
reasoning. There are two dominant versions of doctrinal analysis of
the second form, and each has its own lodestar. The school of nor-
mative law and economics, Chicago style, looks to allocative effi-
ciency. Moral philosophy, meanwhile, looks to conformity with Nat-
ural Law.
I will begin with the Chicago School, whose difficulties are two-
fold. First, the scientistic tendencies of its approach have led its ad-
herents to a hard-line methodological positivism. The Chicago ver-
sion of positivism makes it clear that scientistic analysis must be
sharply distinguished from normative recommendations and that such
recommendations depend on a choice that must be made on some
nonscientistic basis.22 The closer an author making recommendations
comes to the Chicago paradigm, the more that author must explicitly
admit that efficiency is a subjective preference rather than a self-
evident formal axiom. That admission, in turn, defeats the goal of
looking for objectively defensible results in other fields.
Second, the scientistic pretensions of the Chicago School have led
at least its lesser adherents to make claims about the results of their
approach that are indefensible even within its own frame of refer-
ence. The fact of the matter is that the Chicago approach is infected
by the same problem of indeterminacy that the Realists identified in
traditional legal scholarship. The Chicago model of economic analysis
can explain how any policy can achieve whatever goal we choose to
pursue.2 3 Warranties of habitability, for example, both do and do not
promote efficiency.24 This apparently curious outcome may be a re-
sult of the state of the art or, as I suspect, a result of internal incon-
22. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 281, 284-
87 (1979) (distinguishing positive from normative economics).
23. See Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The Limitations of
Legal Economics as a Basis for Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regulation
of Vacation Home Development, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 385.
24. The arguments are summarized in Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative
Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifica-
tions, 89 HARv. L. Rrv. 1815 (1976) (describing conditions under which allocative effi-
ciency is promoted by housing codes). Efficiency, in the models relied on, is defined only
in terms of a partial equilibrium. They do not analyze general equilibrium implications.
See Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFs'RA L. REv. 641 (1980).
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sistencies in the epistemology that underlies the field, but in either
case the immediate problem is the use of unsupported abstraction.
When the scientistic pretensions of the Chicago approach are greatest,
the analyst follows the model of the physical sciences and adopts a
large number of simplifying assumptions. The purified system is then
analyzed, and predictions and explanations are generated. The real
world, however, is necessarily more complex than the purified sys-
tem. It may be true, for example, that economists can generate ap-
parently interesting conclusions by assuming that corporate managers
respond appropriately and exclusively to profit-oriented incentives.
Indeed, they may even be able to explain outcomes in the real world
by assuming that managers so respond, although that is more trouble-
some because of severe measurement problems.25 But the normative
claim that legal regulation should try to affect only profit-oriented
incentives simply does not follow.
26
Similar problems beset the attempt to rely on moral philosophy as
a source of legal insight. If economics challenges common sense with
Science, the brand of moral philosophy now most in vogue elevates
common sense, or at least the common sense of the liberal left, to
Natural Law. Contemporary moral philosophy has the rhetorical ad-
vantage over Chicago School analysis of the chastening of style 27 that
ordinary language philosophy has effected. Indeed, moral philosophers
tell charming fairy tales about the legal system. These fairy tales,
however, like the economists' stories, rest on extraordinarily severe
abstractions from reality. Professor Dworkin, for example, invents a
superhuman judge he calls Hercules; 28 scholars following his trail are
forced to distinguish between situations in which a principle has a
relative weight of 51% and those in which its weight is 49%.29 Another
favorite tactic is to hypothesize a legal system that contains only one
rule that bears on a problem and then show how contemporary moral
25. For an example of the gap between theoretical simplification and available evi-
dence, see Landes & Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Juris-
diction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367 (1980) (available empirical evidence provides limited sup-
port for economic theory of judicial behavior).
26. For an exchange that clarified the point, see Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the
Monopoly Overcharge: A Response to Landes and Posner, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1280 (1980),
and Landes & Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 1274 (1980).
27. I borrow the phrase from Edmund Wilson. See E. WILSON, PATRIOTIC GoR 635-742
(1962) ("The Chastening of American Prose Style").
28. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIUOUSLY 105-06 (1977).
29. D'Amato, Judicial Legislation, 1 CAswozo L. REV. 63, 82-84 (1979).
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philosophy yields clear results in that system. 30 As in the case of
economic analysis, discussion of these abstractions has some meta-
phorical force. But real decisionmakers are weaker than Hercules and
real legal systems have more than one rule. Moral philosophy, in its
present state, can only rely on objective values that are so abstract
that they cannot provide normative guidance in real cases. A theory
of justice in a world with serious imperfections is undeveloped in
the literature and might help. I would bet, however, that a philoso-
pher's theory of second best would establish that moral philosophy
alone must remain insufficient.
The failure of moral philosophy to solve real-world problems em-
phasizes once more the nature of the legal scholar's difficulty. We
must keep in mind the reason for recourse to other fields. Realism
showed that subjectivity and indeterminacy resulted when analysis was
confined to traditional legal discourse. Because the rule of law re-
quires objectivity and determinacy, scholars looked elsewhere to save
the rule of law. I need not argue for my purposes that moral philosophy
is subjective. 31 The truly pressing, and endemic, difficulty is inde-
terminacy.32 The most dramatic example of this difficulty is the one
that I believe made moral philosophy seem attractive. The Supreme
Court's abortion cases could only be defended on philosophical
grounds. Yet the controversy on the issue among professional phi-
losophers is as substantial as that in the political arena. The lawyer's
normative problems are left as unresolved by the invocation of moral
philosophy as they are by the invocation of economics. Moral philos-
ophers and economists are divided into the same camps that mere
lawyers are, and "respect for persons" or "efficiency" turn out to be
translations into esoteric language of "my client wants it." The non-
legal disciplines, as I suspect real economists or philosophers could
have told us from the start, were as partisan as law and, therefore,
could not provide the support that legal scholars sought. Both Chi-
cago School economics and moral philosophy, when they are sub-
30. Richards, The Theory of Adjudication and the Task of the Great Judge, 1 CA wozo
L. Rav. 171, 199-200 (1979). But see Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MicH. L. REv.
1569 (1979) (performing the Herculean task).
31. I do find it somewhat suspicious, though, that the liberal left of the Democratic
Party and not, for example, the Swedish Social Democrats, has a near monopoly on
Natural Law.
32. There is another difficulty that is linked more directly to the theory of second
best. Even if moral philosophers had the ultimate answers, it is not obvious that those
answers would be close enough to contemporary American society for us to enact them
in the incremental manner characteristic of American lawmaking; nor is it clear that
direct moves in the direction of those answers would be the best steps to take in order
to reach them. See Tushnet, Dia-Tribe (Book Review), 78 MICH. L. REv. 694, 708-09 (1980).
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jected to critical scrutiny, accomplish little more than a certain in-
timidation of those of us less versed in particular scholarly fields.
Professional incentives that are already operating will readily eliminate
even that effect.
As in traditional legal scholarship, policy analysis is the alternative
to doctrinal analysis in the second form of legal scholarship. In tra-
ditional policy analysis, common sense is used both to select a goal
and to determine how to achieve it. The second form of policy analysis
does not, at least openly, dispute the goal. Rather, adopting the
strategy of expert analysis in other fields, it questions the common
sense prescription for achieving that goal. This analysis takes one of
two lines. Sometimes it argues that the common sense route may not
get us to the goal as effectively as some other route.33 For example,
when greater corporate responsibility is the goal, the analysis draws
on economic theory to show that such responsibility is maximized
by market, rather than political, processes. 34 Alternatively, it may ex-
amine the side-effects of the common-sense route, showing that, in a
world as perverse as ours, following that route will produce a con-
flict, not with the original goal, but with some other desirable ob-
jective. Eliminating discrimination based on gender, for example, will
require imposing and enforcing limits on the hours that professional
men can work.3 5 The next step of this line of analysis is to search for
a way to reach the original goal, subject to the constraint that in do-
ing so we do not intrude too much on other values. At the end of
the line, of course, the policy analyst all too often concludes that,
in light of all the constraints, we really cannot reach the original
goal at all.
Sophisticated policy analysis of the type I have just described ex-
presses what I call the "life is just a bowl of Jello" point of view.36
According to that view, the world is so complex that if you push at
33. See generally R. PostNE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977) (discussing
efficiency of law in numerous fields).
34. See, e.g., Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1979); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEcAL STm. 251 (1977).
35. Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination
Law, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 55, 105-07.
36. See, e.g., Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. Rv.
1575 (1979) (progressive consumption tax provides theoretically meritorious means of
assessing tax liability but practical and political costs ensure its unworkability); Kirp &
Robyn, Pregnancy, Justice and the Justices, 57 Tax. L. REv. 947 (1979) (question of preg-
nancy benefits must be addressed only after considering costs and benefits to workers and
families); Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975,
89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979) (congressional failure to specify adequately the objectives of the
Age Discrimination Act moves policy debate into court).
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one point where you perceive a problem, the most that you can ac-
complish is to cause the problem to migrate to some other area over"
which, you hope, someone else has jurisdiction.37 If other approaches
to legal scholarship end up losing their power when they are shown
to be indeterminate, the bowl-of-Jello approach tries to escape this
trap by triumphantly concluding that there are no good answers. This
inherently conservative conclusion38 fails as a significant intellectual
achievement, however, because of the same limitations of professional
orientation and liberal imagination that plague the other approaches.
The evidence it relies upon establishes at most, after all, that incre-
mental reasoned interventions in a complex situation are unlikely
to produce satisfactory results, because incremental intervention fails
to deal with surrounding areas into which problems will migrate. But
more substantial reasoned interventions may work. For example, the
resistance of bureaucracies to change is a typical ground for skepticism
about intervention. It may be that if we truly desire change, we will
have to do away with bureaucracy. The aim of policy analysis, how-
ever, is to make recommendations to policymakers. Members of an
existing system of government will only take seriously recommenda-
tions for incremental change within the limits of liberal politics. The
utopian thinking needed to escape from the bowl of Jello is not likely
to be done by those whose immediate audience consists of contem-
porary policymakers, and who are themselves committed to the assump-
tions of liberal theory.39
37. See, e.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550
(1978) (criminal justice is closed system in which discretion can be reallocated but not
reduced).
38. The bowl-of-Jello approach proves to be inherently conservative because it leads
to the conclusion that, in the absence of good alternatives, the statu3 quo ought to be
retained. Another possible conclusion is available, which I call Burkeanism, but it proves
to be unavailing. The Burkean says that whatever choice is made by the system is legiti-
mate and may even contain some hidden wisdom. Although Burkeanism is, on this level
at least, coherent, it will not help the scholar in the professionally oriented attempt to
advise judges and policymakers. The reactionary can at least say that change is bad. The
serious Burkean has to say that change is all right if the system changes, but that is not
terribly useful when the issue is whether a change should be made.
39. Resistance to utopianism arises in part from the liberal view that links utopian
thinking to the social catastrophes of the twentieth century. Aside from overestimating
the importance of thought in transforming the world, this view assumes that only prag-
matic tinkerers can learn from experience. Utopians concerned about bureaucracy specu-
late not about perfecting massive, national bureaucracies, for example, but about con-
structing alliances among small scale, intensely local activities. See, e.g., J. MANsJmGE,
BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980). This perspective is what gives such power to the
otherwise quite different visions of Roberto Unger and Robert Nozick. Moreover, as I.
suggest below, a utopian approach of this type may be the only way to resolve some
of the problems inherent in the liberal theory of law and society. See p. 1223 infra.
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I have argued that the marginality of contemporary legal scholar-
ship results from the combined pressures of professionalism, the de-
sire to support the rule of law, and the attempt to escape the impli-
cations of Realism. I first appreciated that something was at stake
in those pressures when, after I had made what I regarded as rather
mild and standard Realist criticisms of a doctrinal proposal,40 I was
called a power-hungry anarchist.41 I realize, of course, that nobody
really likes to be criticized and I might have discounted, although
not disavowed, the epithet, except that I began noticing that similar,
hostile rejections of the implications of Realism were expressed else-
where. The mild version is the definitional stop: partisanship is a
defining characteristic of the enterprise and that's the end of it.42
One can hardly argue with definitions. But that particular definition
affirms the intellectual marginality of legal scholarship and excludes
from the canon some work done by people who have reputations as
important legal scholars.
Concern over Realism's legacy seems to recur at generational inter-
vals. The recent expressions echo charges made in the 1940s that
Holmes's anticipation of Realism led inexorably to the intellectual de-
fense of totalitarianism. 43 Professor Bickel's discussion in The Least
Dangerous Branch, twenty years later, remains the most revealing. In
a chapter whose first citation is to the article by Professor Gilmore
from which I drew my title, Professor Bickel discusses "the Neo-
Realists [and the] Nihilists."44 He argues that the original Realist po-
sition of the 1920s and '30s, insofar as it exploded the claim that the
text of the Constitution was a self-evident document, was a reasonable
and positive contribution. The danger lay in the work of some of the
successors to the Realists who, engaging in "overkill," 45 asserted the
impossibility of any principled decisionmaking and became purely
result-oriented. 46 For Bickel, the only proper function of judicial re-
view was "to evolve and apply ... fundamental reasons of principle
40. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HAxv.
L. REv. 1698, 1699-705 (1980).
41. Brilmayer, A Rebly, 93 HAxv. L. Rxv. 1727, 1728-29 n.16, 1729-30 (1980).
42. See, e.g., Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV.
1, 13-14, 25 (1979) (stating that the premises of our system assume that principled opinions
are achievable).
43. See White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 19 U. CHi. L. Ray. 51 (1971).
44. A. Bicau., THE La.sr DANGERous B.ANcK 74 n.1, 75-84 (1962).
45. Id. at 75.
46. "The final fruit of neo.realism," he wrote, L... is a genial, nihilistic attitude of
coexistence with the Court and its work, along with a complete lack of interest in the
process by which the work is achieved, or in the proper role of that process in a democratic
society." Id. at 81.
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on which to base men's actions, and which should cut across men's
uncontrolled instincts and interests."4 7 The neo-realist's view that
judges did not engage in this principled discourse, but only did "what
they like[d]" 48 was pernicious, and was no less so if it was sometimes
true.
[I]f the estimate of reality on which it feeds is in any degree cor-
rect, then reality must be changed to exactly that degree. The sin
is mortal, because it propagates a self-validating picture of reality.
If men are told complacently enough that this is how things are,
they will become accustomed to it and accept it. And in the end
this is how things will be.4
9
Professor Bickel's strategy for changing the "neo-realists' " reality
avoided, if barely, the definitional stop. As Professor Ely has noted,
however, Bickel's later work demonstrated his understanding that his
initial strategy needed substantial development, probably in direc-
tions different from those suggested by the Wechslerian emphasis on
principles or the philosophical emphasis on fundamentals. 50 More
important, Professor Bickel, like those Realists he admired, thought
that problems of subjectivity were merely difficulties encountered in
executing a program grounded in the rule of law. Since the Realists
wrote, we have come to understand that the problems they described
arose from the concept of rules and from the characteristics of lan-
guage itself.5
Professor Bickel's adversaries deserved his criticism that they were
expounding "cynicism pure and simple"'5 2 because they attempted to
maintain a defense of the rule of law while simultaneously pushing
Realism to its far boundaries. They understood that liberal political
theory provided no explanation for why people, upon assuming the
role of judge, could suddenly become moved by preferences that
transcended the merely personal. They knew as well that the process
of judicial decision was as subjective as other more obviously politi-
cal activities. What left them open to the charge of cynicism was their
continued adherence to some tenets of liberal theory coupled with
their failure to appreciate that, by translating the subjectivity of pref-
47. Id. at 82.
48. Id. at 84.
49. Id.
50. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DmsRusr 71-72 (1980).
51. The fancy citation for this is L. WrrrmGENiN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVEsrIcATIONS (1953).
52. A. BiCEEI., supra note 44, at 84.
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erence from the legislative to the judicial context, they had under-
mined the only defense liberal theory had against tyranny.
53
There are two possible responses to Professor Bickel's critique. The
first is to deny the force of Realism by attempting to confine its
analysis of rules, through moves such as the appeal to neutral prin-
ciples. That attempt, as we have seen, is intellectually dishonest.
Bickel's struggle to work out a Burkean approach to law, which all
agree he did not completely realize, demonstrates both the depth of
his understanding and the inadequacies of the first two forms of schol-
arship. The second response is to discuss law without assuming that
liberalism's reliance on the rule of law solves the problem of sub-
jectivity. Professor Bickel showed the way by counterposing "per-
sonal preference and personal power"54 to "fundamental reasons . . .
which should cut across men's uncontrolled instincts and interests." 55
Legal scholars need not assume that twentieth-century American so-
ciety approximates the ideal liberal state, and though they may agree
that the rule of law is a necessary component of such a state, they
need not assume that the preconditions of liberalism exist in con-
temporary society. To the extent it brackets but does not reject liberal
political theory, the second response to Bickel's critique should pro-
duce a program of research concerning the social conditions necessary
for the realization of the rule of law. To the extent that it does re-
ject liberal theory, the second response should produce a program of
research on the conditions under which justice, defined in terms other
than the rule of law, can be achieved.56
The third form of contemporary legal scholarship-the study of
law as a phenomenon-comes closest to these programs of research;
it brackets liberal theory by treating law as a phenomenon. In adopt-
ing that strategy, however, the third form abandons the professional
orientation of the other forms of scholarship and places its practi-
tioners under severe pressure. That pressure can be resisted occa-
sionally only at the most elite institutions or elsewhere only under
53. See R. UNGER, supra note 11, at 83-97. Although Bickel addressed the issue of the
rule of law in the context of constitutional law and judicial review, it arises in private
law as well. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HA,.v.
L. REv. 1685 (1976).
54. A. Bic.EL, supra note 44, at 80.
55. Id. at 82.
56. Realism is a powerful intellectual force, in part, because it produced those research
programs directly, though the Realists themselves were far more sophisticated in their
analysis of the concept of the rule of law than they were in this branch of their project.
For a more extended discussion, see Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. Soc.
PuB. TomaS. L. 20, 28-30 (1980).
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unusual circumstances. The work produced under those conditions is
also likely to be seen as marginal to legal scholarship, and thus legal
scholarship's own marginality will persist.57
Unfortunately, much of the work in the third form of scholarship
only extends approaches that are taken in the second form.58 The
dominant strand of positive analysis of law, not surprisingly, is the
economics-of-law approach. I need not recapitulate the various cri-
tiques of this approach,5 9 some of which I suggested in discussing its
normative cousin. Positive analysis along Chicago lines has claimed
that the classical common law promoted allocative efficiency. One of
the explanations offered for why this should be so is that the legal
system somehow tends toward a realization of moral truth or, to
modify Emile Coue's autosuggestive aphorism, that every day in every
way the common law is getting better and better. Professor Priest
tried to describe the mechanism through which such Coueism is ef-
fected.60 But when Professor Priest reduced the abstractness of his
model by adding a single new variable that took account of the pos-
57. Proselytizers for the third form sometimes argue that it is professionally valuable.
The analytic schemes they develop, they say, provide useful ways of organizing a complex
body of information, give insights into the kinds of arguments decisionmakers find at-
tractive, and so on. The professionalist defense of the third form of scholarship is probably
valid, but in a rather restricted sense. Someone who is able to analyze cases and policies
well, as in the first form of scholarship, and who can augment that ability by drawing
on work done in other fields, as in the second form, is likely to be a better lawyer for
being able, in addition, to step back from the whole enterprise to see it as an event
in the world. Unfortunately, few professionals have enough talent to master the first
two forms and then study the third. Selectivity in law school admissions means that the
third form of scholarship will be professionally valuable to a significant concentration
of students only at the most elite institutions. Although there are inevitably a few stu-
dents at every law school who could profit from the third form's approaches, the absence
of a group of sufficient size is likely to create pressures at the less elite schools against
following the model used by some scholars at the more elite schools. Although this
process may well create the conditions for linking elite scholarship to broader intellectual
currents, it also confines such scholarship to elite institutions. Under those circumstances,
those who produce scholarship of the third form may be seen less as lawyers than as
social theorists, economists, or whatever, and their work may not be seen as "legal"
scholarship at all.
58. On the moral philosophy front, Professor Fried recently suggested that we can
examine law as a moral science. Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason
in Moral and Legal History, 9 J. LEGAL Srur. 335 (1980). I have been told that the sug-
gestion was not made entirely seriously and, in any event, I cannot devote much at-
tention to it because there are no clear examples of the enterprise.
59. See, e.g., AN INTRODUC rON To POsr-KEYNEsIAN ECONOMICS (A. Eichner ed. 1979);
TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND DISEQUILnBRIUM (M. Rizzo ed. 1979); Komesar, In Search of a
General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional Alternative (forthcom-
ing MICH. L. Rxv. (1981)); Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis
in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago
Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 950.
60. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
Srun. 65 (1977).
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sibility that cases could be settled before judgment, his earlier re-
sult disappeared. 1
In any case, what Chicagoans call allocative efficiency can equally
well be called capitalist accumulation 62 or the redistribution of wealth
from poor to rich or economic development.6 3 Perhaps more to the
point, the common law can at most be consistent with one construc-
tion of allocative efficiency, even within the neoclassical tradition of
economics. It might not be consistent with other constructions, and
the premises of positive analysis do not provide the basis for choosing
between those constructions.
Positive economic analysis of law has generated some useful in-
sights, although I suspect that Chicagoans will take my specification
of those insights as a backhanded compliment. A major contribution,
for example, is the Chicago School emphasis on invisible hand mech-
anisms, as opposed to the conscious choices of participants, as a means
of explaining activities in the legal system. That contribution has
unfortunately been embedded in more specific and less defensible
claims, and attacks on the specific claims may discredit the more im-
portant general point. In light of all the problems inherent in posi-
tive economic analysis of law, I confess to being unable to rid myself
of the sense that, although it has drawn attention to the subtle op-
eration of power, we would know more about law had the same
energy and intelligence been devoted to understanding Middlemarch64
and The Executioner's Song.0
5
The most productive course that the third form of scholarship could
take probably would involve social theory. Social theory in the twen-
tieth century has revolved around efforts to resolve what have been
conceived of as epistemological problems of social knowledge. The
problems arise as claims to objective knowledge are confronted with
the reality that knowledge is produced by individuals located inex-
tricably within the arena about which they are said to have knowl-
edge. Marxism, by insisting that all knowledge is a social product and
thus that knowledge can have no transcendent validity, generates the
central position to which all theories of knowledge respond.
61. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400-01 (1980).
Priest's general conclusion in this article-that the cases most likely to be resolved by
judges are those whose decisions are least likely to be predicted by any explanatory
theory-only confirms, if in a limited way, the indeterminacy of the rule of law.
62. See M. HoRwrrz, THE TiANsFoRMATIoN OF AMERICAN LAw xvi (1977).
63. See 0. HANDLiN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH 53-92 (1947).
64. G. Euor, MmDLEMARCH (1871-72).
65. N. MAmnL, TnE ExEcuTIoNER's So1uo (1979).
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There is a direct line, intellectual and institutional, from Realism
to the use of social theory in analyzing law.66 Such work, however,
has never had more than the most tenuous toe-hold in law schools.
In part, the reasons are again institutional. The point of entry for
the confrontation of objectivity and subjectivity would have been
Realism in the 1930s. But the cooptive power of the New Deal in
the center and Communist labor-organizing efforts on the left was
great enough to channel young lawyers, who, after all, had been trained
as professionals, away from the issues with which academics in re-
lated fields were concerned. Further, legal academia had fewer po-
sitions and, I suspect, was more strictly hierarchical, than other aca-
demic fields in which a few unorthodox scholars could find lodging
at small liberal arts colleges.07
More recent institutional history is also relevant. Perhaps the best
example comes from Yale Law School, which has been the leading
institution dabbling in the use of social theory in analyzing law since
Realism came of age. During the 1960s, a period that Professor Abra-
ham Goldstein has called the "Dark Ages" of Yale,68 a series of de-
cisions not to grant tenure to certain members of the faculty were
made. When the full story is told, these decisions will be linked to
complex questions of academic and external politics. But there is a
broader point to be made. Yale, as a professional school, is subject
to the professional pressures I discussed earlier. Its ability to resist
those pressures depends on its maintaining its elite position. A num-
ber of strategies are available. Chicago, for example, has achieved its
position by the single-minded pursuit of one specialty. Yale's strategy
has been more subtle. Its goal has been to keep a few steps-or more
mundanely, two to five years-ahead of the pack by having scholars
on the faculty who are now doing what many more people will be
doing in a few years. This strategy, however, has significant impli-
cations for hiring and tenure policies. Tenure can be given only to
those who can switch specialties before the trend line changes direc-
tion. But learning social theory is a difficult enterprise. Few law stu-
66. See J. Schlegel, Institutionalizing the Study of Law and Society: The Law Schools
(June 20-28, 1980) (unpublished paper presented at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the Law
and Society Association) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
67. For a collection of essays that makes this point in a limited, and distinguishable,
context, see THE INTELLECrUAL MIGRATION (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1969) (effect of
European immigrants on American intellectual life). The book's list of "300 Notable
Emigres," id. at 675-718, includes five scholars with significant affiliations with law
schools and reveals the wide range of institutions that initially absorbed the emigres.
68. Without challenging the characterization, I must note that it is less clear to me
than it apparently is to Professor Goldstein who were the monks and who the barbarians.
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dents can absorb enough social theory to become specialists in it at
the same time that they acquire the elite credentials as lawyers or
legal scholars who are more than technicians. Those who master so-
cial theory are, for emotional and intellectual reasons, less likely than
others to be willing or able to convert to other activities should the
institutional need arise, and are, therefore, not attractive candidates
for tenure. Because the conditions for the integration of social theory
and law are even less favorable elsewhere than they are at Yale and
other elite institutions, the tenuous position of this type of legal schol-
arship will certainly continue.
More important than all the institutional forces I have described,
however, there are certain intellectual reasons for the failure of social
theory to emerge in legal scholarship. Sociologists and historians can
raise and face problems of objectivity and subjectivity, difficult as
they may be, without threatening the foundations of their enterprises
because they can reconstruct their fields from the smallest units of
human interaction, as phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists have
done. 69 As I have argued, that is not true of legal scholars in a liberal
society. Some defects in the Realists' early formulations were also in-
fluential. Because the Realists were heirs of the Progressive tradition
in historiography, they tended to attribute outcomes in the legal sys-
tem to the self-conscious and usually self-serving decisions of actors
in the system. Although they understood that their analysis of legal
rules led inevitably to an analysis of the operation of power, they
reduced power to the self-interested actions of a few wilful men or to
pure subjectivity. Debunking the pretensions of those who say they
are motivated only by the public interest is frequently valuable, but
it is almost always an incomplete account of the exercise of power.
The institutional and intellectual barriers to the integration of
legal and social theory are substantial enough that it is unlikely that
legal scholarship will soon be incorporated into the mainstream of
intellectual life. There are several responses to the intellectual mar-
ginality of legal scholarship. First, one could simply give up; the re-
wards accruing to unconventional work and the merits of conven-
tional work are both too small. Second, one might try to overcome
the barriers I have mentioned. Abandoning the liberal theory of law,
one might deny law its privileged status as a device by which to rec-
oncile subjectivity and objectivity and treat it simply as one way
69. This reconstruction has analogues in the utopian program mentioned above, see
note 39 supra, and would begin to deal with the problem of language to which Wittgen-
stein directed our attention, see p. 1217 supra.
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among many others to talk about human problems subject to the
distortions of communication that characterize all of our activities.7'
The second course is grounded in the hope, which is shared by many
contemporary social theorists, that the contrast between subjectivity
and objectivity is only a dilemma within the framework of liberal
theory and can be transcended when some other currently ill-defined
theory is developed. 71 The odds of that hope being well-founded are
greater, I think, than the odds that the problems can be resolved
within liberal theory. But the chances that it is well-founded seem
less than even. That estimate leads to the final possible responses to
the argument I have made. Legal scholars can devote themselves to
replaying the Realist line each time someone comes up with some
clever but, the chances are, unfounded way around Realism's cri-
tique of the rule of law. The work of Professor Leff is my example.72
Finally, they can continue to do conventional legal scholarship, know-
ing that its premises are unsupported and indeed insupportable, pre-
cisely because it makes no less sense than anything else in the world.
There is an intellectual tradition here too. For my purposes I can
say that it begins with Kierkegaard.
70. See, e.g., Habermas. Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence, in yxzwr
SocioLOGy No. 2, at 114 (H. Dreitzel ed. 1970).
71. See, e.g., A. GMDENs, CE~nrAL PROBzmS OF Soc L Taaoay 2-7 (1979); R. UNGEX,
supra note 11, at 236-95.
72. See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L
REv. 451 (1974); Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; Leff,
Memorandum (Book Review), 29 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1977) (review of R. UN aR, supra
note 11).
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